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Fuzzy- Wuzzy Devils:
Mass Media and the Bougainville Crisis
Suzanna Layton
Francis Qna nem bilong em nau long dispela taim i save
kamap long nius pepa, radio na TV long dispela kantri bilong
yumi PNG na tu long wol. Nogat planti man na meri ali save
long Francis Qna bipo, nau long PNG 01 liklik pikinini,
bikpela man, meri, 01 lapun, ai pas tasol 01 save long nem
bilong Francis Qna. 1
LETTER TO THE EDITOR, Arawa Bulletin, 21 APRIL 1989
The Papua New Guinea (PNG) Office of Information, charged in 1978
with reformulating government communication policy, characterized the
mass media as "invaluable . . . for communication and information of a
balanced nature conducive to national unity and democratic progress"
(IRC 1979, 78). However, it admitted the country had "never formulated a
theoretical foundation for its communication activities and has experi-
enced frustration in communication servicing, planning and assessing"
(ibid, 81). A decade later this frustration escalated to anger when a
Bougainvillean juggernaut by the name of Francis ana began making
headlines in what has come to be known as the Bougainville crisis. 2
ana's public career began relatively uneventfully. In March 1988 the
university-educated father of five was elected spokesperson for a group of
disenfranchised landowners at the Bougainville Copper Limited (BCl)
mine in Panguna. Over the next eight months this group, known as the
"new" Panguna Landowners Association (PlA),3 attempted to pressure
BCl and the national government for increased compensation and better
living conditions in the mine site area, with little success. Then, in
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November 1988, one faction of the new PLA led by Ona turned to indus-
trial terrorism to demonstrate their resolve. Sporadic sabotage over the
next two months sent politicians and mining executives scrambling to the
negotiating table, but Ona-by now a folk hero on Bougainville-refused
to negotiate or surrender. In late January 1989 a curfew was placed on
urban centers and villages in the mine area and riot police were ordered in.
Within days the PLA took them on in the mountainous Kongara-region,
but as a new entity, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).
How could a simple compensation dispute coalesce so quickly into a
revolution? Did this "chance event ... change the way men think about
themselves and others, or provoke them to express ideas they had previ-
ously suppressed" (Nelson 1974, 242)? Questions such as these have been
explored in depth elsewhere,4 but a recurrent theme in analyses concerns
the manner in which Bougainvillean autonomy has been subsumed by a
parade of foreign powers-Germany, Australia, Japan-up to and includ-
ing neocolonial integration within the independent nation of Papua New
Guinea. Bougainville's geographic and cultural links are with the western
Solomon Islands, and its distinctively black population of approximately
one hundred fifty thousand perceives itself as a real minority within the
greater "redskin" PNG population of four million. Bougainvilleans believe
national government policies discriminate against them because of this,
with the pursuit of justice an ongoing struggle. The Bougainville Revolu-
tionary Army is the latest expression of that belief.
After the initial attacks on BCL property, the national government
moved quickly toward containment, fearing the spread of factionalism to
other parts of the country. The media were to play an integral part in this
strategy by promoting national unity, publicizing government initiatives,
and maintaining the appearance of control. That the government found
the media less and less successful in these tasks is due partly to the nature
of the events as they unfolded, as well as to unrealistic expectations con-
cerning the media process itself. This paper looks at that process from a
number of perspectives in an effort to map its dynamism, its limitations,
and its reflection of PNG society.
PAPUA NEW GUINEAN MEDIA
Papua New Guinea boasts a relatively wide range of mass media in com-
parison with other nations in the independent Pacific. The National
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Broadcasting Commission (NBC) is the wholly owned government radio
broadcaster. It operates two national services, Karai and Kalang, and a
network of nineteen provincial stations, Kundu, all headquartered in Port
Moresby. No independently owned radio station yet exists in the country,
though such stations would be possible under existing legislation (Hen-
shall 1989). Radio is popularly regarded as the most effective medium for
. information and education ina preliterate society such as Papua· New
Guinea, although a recent inquiry into broadcasting (including television)
identified a number of areas in which its quality could be improved (BIB
1987). However, radio remains the sole mass medium available to the bulk
of the population.
The single television station, EM-TV, has been wholly owned by
National Nine Network (Australia) since late 1990 (Taylor 1991). It, too,
is based in Port Moresby and serves the provincial urban centers of
Goroka, Lae, Mount Hagen, Rabaul, and Madang. Videotaped program-
ming is also sent to the Ok Tedi mining towns of Tabubil and Kiunga, and
to Wau and Bulolo for broadcast on the PNG Forest Products cable sys-
tem. A half-hour of news is broadcast each day in the capital, then
recorded on videotape and flown to the provinces for broadcast the next
day. Otherwise, the station relies heavily on imported programming to
make up the approximately twelve broadcast hours each day. This is not
unusual in the Pacific because of the high cost of local production and the
lack of technical skills.
Several newspapers are also available to complement the broadcast
media. The Papua New Guinea Post-Courier publishes in English five
days a week and has an audited circulation of approximately 35,000. The
majority shareholding is held by Rupert Murdoch's Herald and Weekly
Times Ltd (62.5%), with other private investors in Papua New Guinea
(27.5%) and Australia (10%) holding the remaining shares (Henshall
1989). It is headquartered in Port Moresby and maintains offices in Lae,
Mount Hagen, and Rabaul.
A second daily newspaper, the Niugini Nius, published during much of
the crisis. Owned by expatriate businessman Dennis Buchanan, it closed
in March 1990 after a dispute with the PNG government over work per-
mits for its staff. It too was headquartered in Port Moresby with offices in
Lae and Rabaul, and in Goroka, the headquarters of Buchanan's domestic
airline, Talair. Its unaudited circulation was 15,000 (Solomon 1989).
Two weeklies are published by Word Publishing, owned by the Catho-
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lic (60%), Evangelical Lutheran (20%), Anglican (10%), and United
(10%) churches (Walcot 1984). The Times of Papua New Guinea is
published each Thursday in English and has a circulation of approxi-
mately 9000. Considered one of the best newspapers in the South Pacific,
it is widely read by the more highly educated and active members of PNG
society. Wantok, on the other hand, targets a more rural readership and
uses the lingua franca Tok Pisin for publication. It has a circulation of
15,000.
The single example of an independent provincial press5 in Papua New
Guinea is the Arawa Bulletin of Bougainville founded in 1971 by a group
of BCL employees and handed over in trust to the Bougainville community
in the late 1970s. The trust is administered by a board representing BCL;
national, provincial, and local governments; business; and other commu-
nity groups. The board appoints the managing editor and has fiscal
responsibility, but the managing editor retains full editorial control.
Between 4000 and 5000 copies were published weekly, in English and Tok
Pisin, before publication was suspended when security forces finally with-
drew from the province in March 1990. It employed between two and four
journalists and was distributed by air to all provincial subcenters.
In his proposal for a PNG news agency, University of Papua New
Guinea Journalism Lecturer Peter Henshall found that the range of media
available, while great compared with other Pacific Island nations, belied
its focus on Port Moresby (1989). The four "national" papers all have lim-
ited circulation outside the National Capital District (NCD) and feature
limited provincial coverage. In the Post-Courier and Times provincial
news sources make up a fraction over one-fourth of the total, while NCD
coverage averages 43 percent (Henshall 1989). Wantok is the exception,
with nearly half its news originating in the provinces, and shows the suc-
cess of Word Publishing efforts to set up a provincial "stringer" network.
Yet, the fact that the network is not used to the same extent by the Times
reinforces the idea that the primary audience of the Times resides in Port
Moresby.
The amount of space given to provincial stories shows a similar pat-
tern. When Henshall measured reports about the nineteen provinces and
the NCD, he found the NCD topped the table with 57.45 percent of cover-
age, distantly followed by Morobe with 9.64 percent. Their capitals, Port
Moresby and Lae, represent the two largest markets in the country. 6
Broadcast news analysis revealed similar patterns, though government,
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education, justice, and capital works departments-all prime news
sources-are significantly decentralized to the provinces (Henshall 1989).
The focus on Port Moresby can be traced in part to the fact that most
working journalists are based there. 7 Although this is understandable
because of financial limitations on media organizations, it leads unfortu-
nately to a highly centralized and somewhat incestuous media system.
Henshall argued that the reason little news came from the provinces was
that journalism skills were scarce "out there" (1989). Although there may
be some truth in this, it ignores the fact that the Arawa Bulletin published
between five and eight pages of provincial news weekly and was used reg-
ularly as a source by Radio North Solomons, the NBC provincial station
on Bougainville. Also, in the mid 1980s, Arawa Bulletin reporters were
encouraged to freelance for the capital city press with little success. Both
the Post-Courier and Word Publishing papers were generally uninterested
unless they could "break" the story. This myopic focus on the capital has
serious consequences in a decentralized and evolving political system such
as Papua New Guinea's, with developments on Bougainville a case in
point. 8
DISCOURSE VERSUS REALITY
The crisis effectively had two fronts-the skirmish on the ground and the
struggle over public opinion in the media. Although this is common in the
West, it is an important and unusual exception to media policy in the
Pacific. Island governments believe media to be powerful agents of
change. They base this belief on research out of North America indicating
traditional societies are very receptive to Western forms of mass communi-
cation (Lerner 1958; Pye 1963; Schramm 1964). As a result nearly all
broadcast stations and many newspapers are government owned, with
ideological competition in those media limited to statements made by the
opposition.
Studies conducted in Western societies, however, found media to exert
a more limited influence. "Communication research strongly indicates
that persuasive mass communication is in general more likely to reinforce
the existing opinions of its audience than it is to change such opinions"
(Klapper 1960, quoted in Tunstall 1970, 22). The findings from these
studies showed that people first of all selectively exposed themselves to
mediated information consonant with their worldview, and then inter-
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preted these messages according to "existing structures of social relation-
ships and systems of culture and belief" (McQuail I977, 73). Nash and
Ogan, however, provide evidence that this distinction between modern
and traditional societies is somewhat dubious. They found news of the
I972 Rovin-Moini murders9 was also interpreted by the Nagovisi and
Nasioi people of central Bougainville "in ways that fit preexisting attitudes
and indeed confirmed them!' (Nash andOgan I990, TO).-
During the ongoing crisis the national government's fundamental posi-
tion has been to preserve national unity, and communication policy ini-
tially focused on persuasive appeals to that effect. However, this agenda is
problematic, derived as it is from colonial history and compromised by
the lack of a basic commonality, such as shared language, culture, reli-
gion, or education (Bonney I986). The ephemeral nature of the nationalist
agenda is exacerbated in the case of Bougainville, whose people are distin-
guished from all other ethnic groups in Papua New Guinea on the basis of
their unique skin color (Nash and Ogan I990). Partly for this reason
Bougainvillean-style ethnonationalism has been an integral part of the
Bougainvillean identity since the late I950S (Ryan I969).10 Though this
nationalism was contained most recently in the late 1970S through the
institution of provincial government, history shows it quick to reassert
itself when Bougainvilleans believe themselves oppressed. In his press
statements, Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu chose to ignore rather than
explore this fundamental social reality-"We must not let a small minority
destroy these great opportunities for the people of any part of our nation .
. . . We are one people, one nation, and we have one future-a shared
future which will bring greater prosperity and opportunity for all our peo-
ple" (AB, I4 Apr I989).
The nationalist rhetoric resonated with the majority of Papua New
Guineans, whose solidarity was no doubt caused in part by the wide-
spread stereotype of Bougainvilleans as a self-serving people. ll "Unity
must also be preached through the national media-radio, television and
Press-in order to make our four million people aware of their responsi-
bility to nationhood" (PNGPC, 21 Apr I989).
On Bougainville, however, people were facing the reality of repeated
abuse at the hands of the security forces. Although most Bougainvilleans
conceded, if not actively supported, the integrity of the state of Papua
New Guinea in the early stages of the crisis, the unpunished harassment of
women, children, and the elderly provided a very tangible yardstick
against which nationalist rhetoric could be measured. The national gov-
-_. ---- --------- ------------------------------
LAYTON. FUZZY-WUZZY DEVILS
ernment had assured the Bougainvilleans it would "do everything possible
to ensure the security forces use these powers responsibly" (Namaliu
1989). The fact that the government subsequently failed even to admit
there was a problem caused Bougainvilleans to regard other news reports
of government initiatives or successes with suspicion. A provincial govern-
ment media liaison officer complained, "We were really frustrated in our
progress by the .action of the security forces. They really worked against
the government trying to gain the people's confidence [through awareness
campaigns], and ill-feeling was created" (Tapi 1989).
This "ill-feeling" was distilled into secessionism according to "existing
systems of culture and belief" and spread throughout Bougainville via
interpersonal media, such as rumor, two-way radios, faxes, even tee-shirts
and church pulpits (Spriggs 1990), in much the same way mullahs in Iran
distributed cassettes broadcast over mosque loudspeakers to mobilize the
Iranian population toward revolution in the mid 1970S (Tehranian 1979).
The national government, apparently oblivious to the loss in its credibil-
ity, persisted in a rhetorical media discourse that only worked to entrench
opinions it had hoped to eradicate.
NEWS AS CONSTRUCTED REALITY
In addition to highlighting the limitations of the mass media in convincing
people day is night, coverage of the unfolding events on Bougainville pro-
vided examples of bias inherent in any Western-modeled media system.
Objectivity, for example, is a widely regarded professional value, yet
many studies of Western media detail ideological, organizational, and
functional constraints on "objective" depictions of events in the news.
Ideologically, mass media have been found to "favour the institutional-
ised conventions of liberal democratic society and . . . reject (or treat as
non-existent) those groups or individuals who either do not conform to,
or appear to challenge, the established system" (McColl 1980, 425-426).
This institutional bias allowed the national press, particularly in the early
stage of conflict, to accept the government view that the situation in
Panguna was an atomistic law-and-order problem, and kept them a step
behind in assessing the extent of secessionist developments later on. This
bias is also a factor behind the reliance on pejorative, as opposed to neu-
tral, language in crisis coverage, which will be discussed in greater detail
shortly.
Organizational constraints on the Australian media in particular
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(PNG's model) have been explored by Henningham (1988), Tiffen (1989),
and Edgar (1979) among others. They argue that the media are inherently
conservative and supportive of industrial capitalism as a result of the
diversified commercial interests of media proprietors and their political
patrons. Journalists become socialized to these proprietorial interests by
learning to conform with editorial policies that are often vaguely ex-
pressed, so as not to compromise the professional myth of objectivity
(Breed 1954). Carey (1969) found this kind of socialization also present in
the relationship between journalists and their sources, with reporters
gradually internalizing the attitudes and expectations of the government
and its agenda.
Functional or technical constraints, such as those imposed by dead-
lines, or by the space, time, and money available to cover an event, further
contribute to the distortion and packaging of reality as "news" (Hen-
ningham 1988). The resulting bias can take a number of forms-"source
bias, unbalanced presentation of controversial issues, emphasis on the
exceptional event rather than the process or context, the frequent use of
packaged formula, selection and omission of information, and quite often
a reliance on partisan sources such as official communiques, press
releases, speeches and interviews with leaders" (Peh and Melkote 1990, I).
In Papua New Guinea prior to the crisis, the reliance on partisan
sources was by far the most common institutional bias. Many "news"
reports were often press releases with the occasional "he said" inserted
into copy. Though this kind of respect for leadership is a widely accepted
cultural value in Papua New Guinea, it is not uniquely Melanesian. Simi-
lar patterns of reporting are common in the US small-town and commu-
nity press (Janowitz 1952). Like the PNG press, these papers were also
found to emphasize consensus, promote local traditions and identity, and
avoid controversy except when it related to another municipality. In
national press crisis coverage, Bougainville effectively became that "other"
municipality.
On Bougainville itself the provincial press immediately recognized land-
owner discord in the mine site area as newsworthy, covering the first offi-
cial meeting of the new PLA, BCL, and the national and provincial govern-
ments. The Arawa Bulletin reported that fifty members of the PLA
discussed "demands for increased compensation, better housing and con-
ditions" (IS Apr 1988). The story noted the landowners were represented
by their "newly-elected committee," with Perpetua Serero12 as chair and
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Francis Ona as spokesperson. By late July full-page features about the
negotiations, demands, and PLA leadership struggle were appearing each
week, competing successfully for space with coverage of the provincial
election, Operation Mekim Save,13 and other major events. Community
interest in the topic was high, though opinion varied, as reflected in letters
to the editor. However, national government and company complacency
was also apparent. Only when violence threatened did the negotiators
take the PLA at all seriously-on one occasion landowner occupation of
the mine site was averted by a "last minute" visit by Minerals and Energy
Minister Patterson Lowa (AB, 5 Aug 1988). Yet, over the next three months
landowners persevered with nonviolent activism, including awareness
campaigns and letters to the editor, the occupation of the Road Mine Tail-
ings Lease Trust Fund offices, peaceful demonstrations at provincial gov-
ernment headquarters, and lobbying for an environmental study on the
Jaba River, all extensively covered by the Arawa Bulletin (19, 26 Aug 1988,
1,9 Sept 1988, II Nov 1988).
The PLA finally caught the attention of the national press when it
embarked on its campaign of industrial terrorism in late November 1988.
Bougainvilleans were then able to read about the events in Panguna from
two perspectives, national and provincial. The national dailies, in particu-
lar, focused on the law-and-order angle. The Post-Courier reported the
theft of explosives from the BCL magazine on 22 November and described
the landowners as unpredictable gang members operating in a "volatile
situation." In contrast, the Arawa Bulletin report of the incident focused
on the anonymous caller who warned the premier that four targets were
ready to be blasted. That story also noted reports of similar thefts in April
that year (AB, 25 Nov 1988),14 highlighting PLA deliberation and planning.
Controversial and emotive language became more entrenched in subse-
quent national daily reports with the landowners referred to as "crimi-
nals," "saboteurs," and "gangsters who use ... the code names Rambo I,
2, 3, and 4" (PNGPC, 5 Dec 1988, 2). Three months into the conflict and
perturbed by the continuing bias in presentation, former media executive
Carolus Ketsimur, himself a Bougainvillean, complained:
Mr. Siaguru questions the actions of the Panguna landowners and the Defence
Force soldiers and admonishes the two groups for taking the law into their
own hands. In doing so, however, he describes the landowners as a "[b]and of
brigands" while the soldiers are described as ... "our soldiers." ... Nobody
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1992
wants to know the "brigands," "rebels," "terrorists" or whatever else the
Panguna landowners have been described as in the press. (PNGPC, 20 Feb
1989, II)
He also noted that contextual information was being selectively applied:
"No theory is advanced as to why the landowners took the action they did
and there's no suggestion that theywere as angry and frustrated as the sol-
diers. In fact, the two paragraphs on the Panguna landowners action
didn't seem to have much to do with the rest of the article. They seem to
have been put in there just to have yet another swipe at the landowners"
(ibid).
Ona refused to surrender during the January 1989 ceasefire, and riot
police were soon dispatched in a "mopping up" operation. The national
press, under headlines such as "Surrender or die," saw it as a Papua New
Guinean Apocalyspe Now, with Francis Ona as Marlon Brando in black-
face.
Fully-armed riot squad police are set to go into the jungles in search of militant
Panguna landowner Francis Qna and his group of supporters. The police are
armed with sub-machine guns, semi-automatic AR15 rifles, pistols, shotguns
and tear-gas guns and cannisters. They will begin their manhunt either tomor-
row or Friday depending on finalisation of plans. (PNGPC, 25 Jan 1989, 2)
The infamous Francis Qna, who forced the imposition of the curfew with his
violent acts against Bougainville Copper Limited, is still in hiding in the jungles
with his small group of supporters. (PNGPC, 31 Jan 1989, 3)
The positioning of the landowners as anarchists was exacerbated by the
rise in rascalism, the sekonhan BRA, which accompanied the crisis and
whose relationship to the BRA tru was blurred in the national press. In a
March 1989 Arawa Bulletin report, Ona clearly identified the sekonhan
BRA as a threat to the movement. He blamed Pakia and Parakake village
youths for "terrorising innocent people since the present crisis took effect
in November 1988" and warned the ringleader, a young relative of old PLA
board chairman Severinus Ampaoi, not to "take advantage of his [Ona's]
group's struggle over genuine issues" (AB, 3 Mar 1989).15 Yet, the distinc-
tion between the two quite separate groups was never clarified in Port
Moresby-based media reports. This imbued the PLA with a criminal char-
acter derived from the rascal groups, and set Ona up for censure over his
inability to control their activities.
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This criticism, a continuing theme in coverage, overlooked the fact that
organized rascalism has long been a thorn in the side of legitimate pro-
vincial leadership. Although rarely approaching the situation in Port
Moresby and Lae, criminal activity on Bougainville reached unacceptable
levels in the urban areas in early I988, forcing premier Kabui to resort to
Operation Mekim Save. But the special operation caught few real rascals,
and, during the state of emergency the following year, security forces
failed to perform any better. During the blockade, criticism over Ona's
failure in this regard reached extraordinary heights. He was expected not
only to succeed where the disciplined forces and legitimate governments
had not, but to do it in the face of the infrastructural and communications
obstacles that existed in the province following the withdrawal of govern-
ment services. The support this kind of criticism provided for continued
military intervention should not be discounted.
These kinds of institutional biases reflect, in part, deep-seated social
biases more clearly seen in the media's handling of ethnic disruption in the
province four months into the uprising. In March I988, twenty-two-year-
old Bougainvillean Clement Kavuna died of brain damage after being
picked up by the PNG police riot squad for questioning. According to
police, Kavuna was injured after he jumped from a moving police vehicle
in an escape attempt. Relatives insisted he fell while being beaten by
drunken police in the back of the vehicle (AB, I7 Mar I988). The same
week, thirty-two-year-old Bougainvillean Deborah Raboni allegedly was
axed in her garden by a Papua New Guinean plantation worker. In repri-
sal for these deaths, a group of Bougainvilleans armed with automatic
weapons opened fire on a group of Papua New Guinean plantation work-
ers the following week (PNGPC, 2I Mar I988). Two workers died and
three were seriously injured. These events inflamed long-standing tensions
between blackskin Bougainvilleans and redskin Papua New Guineans and
were followed by widespread rioting by Papua New Guineans and their
mass exodus from the province.
Nash and Ogan describe how Bougainvillean reaction to the Raboni
murder in particular mirrored attitudes expressed after the Rovin-Moini
incident: "Once again Bougainvilleans perceived 'redskins' acting out their
primitive, savage nature, with a peaceful black-skinned woman as victim"
(I990, 12). Few Bougainvilleans, however, are employed in the national
media. Papua New Guinean dominance there reflects its proportional
dominance in the national population. "Reporting is not simply a matter
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of collecting facts, whether about a race riot or about anything else. Facts
do not exist on their own but are located within wide-ranging sets of
assumptions, and which facts are thought to be relevant to a story
depends on which sorts of assumptions are held" (Braham 1982).
The national press reacted with hysteria, running front-page headlines
such as "Bougainville comes to a standstill: Rumored rampage forces
shops, schools and banks to close" (PNGPC, 21 Mar 1989,1). Though that
report ostensibly dealt with unexpected peace, the theme of interethnic
violence was stressed: "There was no rampage but all shops, commercial
banks, business houses and government offices were shut in fear of a ram-
page by non-Bougainvilleans seeking vengeance over the merciless slaying
of five Western Highlanders in their Aropa Plantation shed last Friday"
(ibid, emphasis added). Similarly, in Australia, the notion of violence
found its way into mainstream media coverage of the peaceful protest by
Aboriginal people during the 1988 bicentennial celebrations: "White
authorities have prepared for anything from violent riots to sabotage and
bombings" ("Carroll at Seven," 21 Jan 1988, in Meadows and Oldham
1991 ,33)
However, when Papua New Guineans in Kieta, Toniva, and Arawa did
eventually take to the streets, evidence that the mainly Papua New Guin-
ean police force had done little to contain the situation appeared only in
the provincial press.
I saw two policemen amongst the troublemakers with their thumbs up....
On Monday ... at Arawa ... police were watching the so-called Highland-
ers and Sepiks helping themselves from the shops. They didn't arrest any of the
troublemakers. What was going on? Were the rampages in Toniva and Arawa
encouraged by the police? Were the police one-sided with their wantoks
instead of being the middle man to restore law and order? (Letter to the editor,
AB, 7 Apr 1989)
Allegations such as these prompted the Bougainville provincial assem-
bly to unanimously pass a motion calling for the Papua New Guinean pro-
vincial police commander's dismissal. The story was ignored by the
national media, which persisted in linking Bougainvilleans per se with dis-
order. The following week a Niugini Nius report managed to shift the
blame for the riots back onto the militants, under the headline "Business
as usual": "The soldiers are also under orders, because of their experience
in jungle fighting, to flush out the militant Bougainvilleans whom they
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believe to be largely responsible for the havoc caused around the Arawa
townships and outstations" (NN, 30 Mar 1989, 5). In this way press cover-
age reflected the PNG social context aptly symbolized by the national flag
-a red half dominating a black half, with only a patch of gold in common
(Nash and Ogan 1990).
DIRECT INTERVENTION IN THE MEDIA
Though the media, in fact, reflected a Papua New Guinean bias through
the mechanisms discussed, the lack of provable successes on Bougainville
panicked the PNG government into attempting more direct control, a tac-
tic common in situations where the political leadership fails to meet set
goals (Curry 1982). Censorship surfaced, in the form of denying access to
information, after the initial clash between rebels and police at Kongara,
three months into the insurgency. Police officials would "neither deny nor
confirm the report. It is understood they later instructed their officers not
to talk to members of the press or even to put telephone calls through to
them" (PNGPC, I Feb 1989, 2).
This had the immediate and, in terms of government goals, dysfunc-
tional effect of forcing the media to physically go to Bougainville to
research their stories. This arguably resulted in increased coverage, as
journalists were able to develop contacts with the BRA more readily, and
editors devoted more space to crisis coverage in order to rationalize travel
expenses. More important, it antagonized the media, forcing them into an
adversarial role in defense of their professional integrity.
This was expressed clearly a short time later when the government
banned foreign news reporters from traveling to Bougainville. Page one
stories in the newspapers trumpeted the 21 March Cabinet decision, made
ostensibly on the grounds of not being able to guarantee their "safety"
(PNGPC, 28,30 Mar 1989; AB, 31 Mar 1989). Reports detailed how armed
police on Bougainville stopped aircraft from carrying a television crew for
Australia's Seven Network and attempted to confiscate their tapes. When
this failed, the crew were told they would be met in Port Moresby by the
National Intelligence Organisation, with the tapes to be vetted then.
Photographs of the Seven Network crew, and of Australian Broadcasting
Corporation Resident Correspondent Sean Dorney who was also asked to
leave the island, accompanied these reports. They were followed by cover-
age of statements by leaders opposed to the ban, and news of a further
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blackout on an upcoming joint police and army operation (NN, 30 Mar
1989; PNGPC, 6 Apr 1989).
In contrast, the BRA appeared to realize that censorship tops any edi-
tor's list of newsworthy topics. "Keep talking to the radio and newsmen"
ana urged his sister in a letter subsequently published in the Post-Courier
(28 Apr 1989). But while the BRA wisely avoided direct confrontation with
the media themselves, it attempted to intervene in the process through per-
sonal threats directed at high profile public servants involved in crisis
management. "We warn you not to speak against our proposal of seces-
sion move, no more media broadcasts by you" (PNGPC, 21 Apr 1989, 12).
Terrorism of this sort is also recognized as priority copy by the media, and
run as such.
The government became highly critical of the press when attempts to
control it only backfired. Deputy Prime Minister and former Commander
of the PNG Defence Force Ted Diro was particularly hostile. At one of the
journalist association's "Club Spik lsi" sessions, he called the [Niugini
Nius] headline "Wanted: dead or alive" "irresponsible and cheap," adding
that it was the creation of the newspaper and not the phrasing of the press
release. He deplored "those who sought to gain cheap notoriety by leaking
privileged information," and questioned "the ethics of the publishers who
make use of such material in a sensitive situation such as 'Bougainville"
(TPNG, 28 Sept-4 Oct 1989, 4).
Diro also carpeted an experienced Times journalist over her report on
the "St. Valentine's Day Massacre," in which a Methodist pastor and five
of his parishioners allegedly were executed by the PNG Defence Force,
which then dumped their bodies into the sea from an Australian Defence
Force-supplied helicopter. "When we published the story, Diro called ask-
ing me to go and meet him. So I went with our general manager and he
[Diro] explained to me that what I had written was all nonsense and that I
wanted to make a name for myself" ("Dateline," 21 June 1990). The mas-
sacre was later verified by Colonel Leo Nuia, commander of the security
forces on Bougainville at the time, on an Australian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration "Four Corners" report (24 June 1991). Nuia was subsequently
sacked, and, in a news year dominated by secessionist movements in the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, that show won the Australian 1991 Walkley
award for best television investigative report.
Diro is not the only man with a military background to display enmity
toward members of the media. An analysis of US wartime media-military
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relations since World War II describes an inbuilt "cultural conflict"
between journalists and the military: "The military culture, with its accent
on conformity, control, discipline, accountability, group loyalty, and
cohesion, finds itself in wartime up against a group that is individualistic,
competitive, word-conscious, impatient, lacking internal 'rules' or 'stan-
dards,' varied in its needs, suspicious of authority and hard-pressed by
deadlines" (Braestrup I985, 14I).
On Bougainville, this cultural conflict occasionally escalated into vio-
lence. In late March I988, the Arawa Bulletin offices were occupied and
the staff threatened by heavily armed security forces seeking a particular
reporter who had met and interviewed BRA Defence Force Commander
Sam Kauona. Six weeks later the reporter concerned was assaulted by
police and kept overnight in jail for "curfew violations" when he at-
tempted to interview victims of a police raid at Arawa General Hospital
(AB, I2 May I989). Two NBC employees were also assaulted by security
forces one morning in April while they were on their way to work. Back in
Port Moresby, the Times journalist quoted earlier was hauled before the
National Intelligence Agency and accused of disloyalty, along with being
subjected to anonymous death threats and repeated break-ins ("Dateline,"
I990). These attacks, widely reported, did little to endear the media to the
national government cause.
A concern for control over public opinion also led the government to
extend the concept of radio awareness campaigns to include disinforma-
tion. In the letter to his sister quoted before, Ona warned his supporters
that "the report over the radio that we are smuggling guns is not true. It is
only a campaign by the Government to get Australian assistance. Don't
believe what is said over the radio by the Government" (PNGPC, 28 Apr
I989). Although Ona was hardly an impartial observer, a British anthro-
pologist visiting relatives in the Tinputz area in January I990 also wrote of
listening to "fantasy-like pronouncements of Police Commissioner Tohian
on the radio about the situation being under control" (Spriggs I990, 30).
These campaigns reached their height during the blockade, when the
province was theoretically shut off from all contact with the rest of the
country. A defense intelligence report published in late April I990 had spe-
cifically recommended that, in addition to cutting off shipping, "a psycho-
logical warfare effort must go into action to exploit the situation" ("Date-
line," 2I June I990). NBC radio broadcasts continued to be received in
many parts of the island and a cocoa farmer resident in the north wrote:
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During this time, as we sat in fear and isolation, we were bombarded with gov-
ernment bullshit-half truths, one-sided viewpoints and straight out lies com-
ing through the NBC here. The more I heard the more frustrated I got.... It
became just a govt. propaganda machine and that was responsible for a lot of
angry feeling on B'ville. (Personal letter to author, 13 June 1991)
This "Radio Free Papua New Guinea" strategy was reinforced by a block-
ade of information coming from Bougainville, effectively censoring any
further pro-BRA news in the national media. Ironically, military strategists
Schelling (1966) and Halperin (1966) identify this kind of noncommunica-
tion as also part of the process of influence. "Influence uses threat, intimi-
dation ... and silence in an effort to change the behavior of an opponent
by building an appearance [original emphasis] of inequality. Whereas the
nation that is strong will simply take, a relative equal resorts to influence.
. . . Even in war such communication exists" (Starosta 1976, 322).
Coupled with a desire to prevent "ethnic nationalism" from further
feeding "on its own publicity" (Griffin 1990, 2), the national government
strove to limit evidence that Bougainville could exist as an autonomous
political or economic entity. One example concerns the rise in the influ-
ence of traditional chiefs, and a devolution of power to their local author-
ity. Though this had been initiated by Kabui's government prior to the
conflict, the power vacuum left by the national government's withdrawal
of personnel and services accelerated the process. Sources indicate these
chiefs, representing many of the values enshrined in BRA ideology and
long marginalized by the Western political system, held enough respect
among the differing political factions, first, to bring Bougainvillean soci-
ety back to some semblance of order, and, second, to provide the mecha-
nism necessary for a negotiated peace. The rest of the country, however,
was left with the image that suited the government agenda-a province in
the grips of anarchy. If, indeed, one of the stated functions of the media in
Papua New Guinea is to "dispel fear" (IRC, 1979,9), these peaceful devel-
opments should have been more widely reported. 16 That they were not is
consistent with national government disapproval of any information that
might legitimize social and political change on Bougainville.
NEGLECTED THEMES
Institutional bias is also reflected in the apparent consensus throughout
the media not to report certain issues or events, newsworthy though they
may be in the "objective" sense. For instance, there is the curious absence
!nil. '.n
LAYTON. FUZZY-WUZZY DEVILS
I(III;! .•. ,
of any real investigation into why the Bougainville Copper Agreement
(BCA) reviews were never carried out. Early on, the topic was approached
briefly from the point of personalities. In one report, former Prime Minis-
ter Sir Julius Chan outlined his government's 1981 four-part BCA revenue
package, rejected at that time by the province, and said political rival and
current Minister for Provincial Affairs Father John Momis should "carry
the bulk of the blame" (PNGPC, 23 Jan 1989, 2). Though Momis responded
with accusations of his own, the general feeling among national, provin-
cial, and local government leaders was to get on with the job of finding a
solution. Former diplomat Sir Paulius Matane explicated this very clearly:
"I would suggest we not blame anybody. I don't believe in passing the
buck, but in taking the yoke and shouldering it" (TPNG, 13-19 Apr 1989,
6). BCL, and sections of the new PLA leadership happy with the progress
made in negotiations at that time, concurred.
Yet, the way journalists shied away from any in-depth investigation
indicates many of the participants in the review process continue to wield
influence. Every reporter knows it is not good practice to unnecessarily
antagonize one's sources, yet it is also important to clarify how issues such
as taxation, the further devolution of financial powers to the province, or
the lifting of the prospecting moratorium may have hindered the resolu-
tion of problems at an earlier stage. Central to these issues is the tension
between Melanesian common law understandings of mineral ownership
and Australian law accepted at the time of independence. As far as jour-
nalists are concerned, these issues will not go away simply because it is
inconvenient to write about them. Landowners are becoming increasingly
involved in the direct negotiation of mineral compensation packages, and,
in line with government communication policy recommendations in the
past, it is the role of the media to inform them of the political and eco-
nomic situations they may have to face (IRC 1979).
Related to the selective amnesia over the BCA is the lack of any follow-
up as to why underdevelopment was allowed to persist so long in the relo-
cated villages. Again, the magnitude of this oversight renders it an enor-
mously sensitive area. Tangential references to "lessons learned" have
avoided reports degenerating into a messy and counterproductive debate
over who defaulted in which responsibility. But the important question,
why, remains unexplored. Its absence from coverage compromises one of
the most widely agreed on responsibilities of the press in Papua New
Guinea-to explain government policies to the people.
The historical aspect of the BRA as an organization is another signifi-
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cant gap in coverage. Most of the background features focused on the
exclusion of the female landowners in the original negotiations, and in the
generational friction in the mine site area, effectively containing the
"cause" of the crisis within a very limited context. Very little attention has
been paid to developments in what former Premier Leo Hannett calls pro-
vincial "party politics" during the 1980s (Hannett 1989).17 More than a
simple flowering in expectation as a result of 1987 election campaign rhet-
oric, the decade was characterized by an increasing, and provincewide,
ideological schism between those who favored the Hannett administra-
tion's model of development corporation capitalism and those who
preached the Melanesian Alliance emphasis on distributive participation.
Hannett fought the Melanesian Alliance on the rationale that the province
must stand united in negotiations with the national government and was
chagrined when the party established "firm roots at the grassroot level"
(ibid). Those roots eventually grew into a sizable enough voting bloc over
such issues as the proposed Laluai River hydroelectric scheme to unseat
him as premier in the 1984 election. A number of rank-and-file campaign-
ers for the Melanesian Alliance in that election, who apparently later
became disenchanted with the refusal of the party to embrace secession-
ism, have since turned up in the BRA hierarchy. Their persistence in the
pursuit of political power should signal a warning to those who believe
"the Bougainville problem" will be solved simply through the assassina-
tion or arrest of the more prominent BRA ideologues such as Ona or
Kauona.
CONCLUSION
The struggle over public opinion in the Papua New Guinea press was
fiercely fought, but with limited success. For the most part, the crisis was
reported through Papua New Guinean, not Bougainvillean, eyes. Nation-
alist ideology-exacerbated by institutional, organizational, and func-
tional influences on the centralized Port Moresby media-resulted in the
portrayal of the BRA as anarchists and traitors. Bougainvilleans effectively
became "fuzzy-wuzzy devils"-in contrast to the "fuzzy-wuzzy angel" ste-
reotype of Papua New Guineans constructed in the postwar Australian
press (Nelson 1974, 86). When ethnic violence flared during the crisis, cov-
erage of this ilk only inflamed shallowly concealed antipathies. These
antipathies deepened through firsthand experience with security force
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abuses and were shared through the informal communication networks
that have influenced public opinion in Melanesian communities for centu-
ries. The power of these networks should not be underestimated. Though
mass media can and do playa number of roles in Papua New Guinean
society, Bougainville crisis coverage has clearly highlighted the inadequacy
of government communication policies that patronize the natural intelli-
gence of grass-roots people.
Notes
I "Lately, the name Francis Ona appears constantly in the newspapers, radio
and television of this country of ours, PNG, as well as those of the world. Few
people had heard of Francis Ona before, but now in PNG every man, woman and
child-even the aged and the blind-all know his name."
2 This is the second so-named constitutional emergency to be faced by Papua
New Guinea. The first occurred in the early 1970S and highlighted deficiencies in
communication policy similar to those experienced in the current crisis. "[I]t was
no coincidence that the decision to exclude provincial government from the Con-
stitution was made immediately after the major breakdown in negotiations with
Bougainville. Because of this breakdown in communication between the two gov-
ernments, the central government did not fully understand the reasons for the
Bougainville crisis. Consequently ... the government's reasoning was based to
some extent on a misinterpretation of facts" (Conyers 1976, 65).
3 To distinguish them from the "old" PLA, which signed the 1980 "minor" com-
pensation agreement with BCL. Originally, a BCL watchdog and forum for land-
owner interests, decisions taken by executives of the old PLA and its investment
arm, the Road Mine Tailings Lease Trust Fund (RMTLTF), were increasingly criti-
cized by landowners in the mine site area as being pro-BCL (Okole 1990). Ris-
ing discontent existed also over the distribution of compensation payments:
"Last year, RMTL gave K99,000 to the beneficiaries of which K54,000 was
paid to all committee members of the Panguna Landowners Association. The
payment is for services rendered in negotiating compensation payments with
BCL in the early days" (AB, 6 May 1988). One kina equals about one American
dollar.
4 See Conyers 1976, Griffin 1990, Griffin and Kawona 1989, Hannett 1975,
Havini 1990, Laracy 1976, Mamak and Bedford 1974, May 1982, Momis and
Ogan 1972, Ogan 1990, Oliver 1973, Ryan 1969, Worsley 1957.
5 Ten newsletters, some of them quite lively, were being published more or less
regularly by provincial governments at the time of my 1989 survey of the PNG
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press (Layton 1990). All, however, strongly reflected government patronage in
their copy.
6 North Solomons ranked twelfth out of twenty in the study, which was con-
ducted in late August and early September 1988. During this period the new PLA
attempted to break the four-month stalemate in negotiations with BCL and the
national government by occupying the RMTLTF offices run by the old PLA,
generating a great deal of copy in the Arawa Bulletin.
7 Seventy-seven percent of independent newspaper journalists and 41 percent
of government information officers (Henshall 1989).
8 The Post-Courier now publishes a sixteen-page four-color insert titled Pro-
vincial News and encourages readers from all over the country to submit articles.
9 Dr Luke Rovin and teacher Peter Moini, both Bougainvilleans, were killed
by Highlanders following a road accident in Goroka in which a young Highland
girl died.
10 "Relatively educated Bougainville men began talking about it openly in
1958.... Albert Maori Kiki, at Buka Passage in 1962 as a government welfare
officer, told in 1968 how a Bougainville man's petition for his island's indepen-
dence was taken by government officers before he could present it to Sir Hugh
Foot's United Nations Visiting Mission" (Ryan 1969, 335).
II "It is often believed that the Bougainvilleans' attempt to secede has been
motivated primarily by their selfish desire to receive all the profits from the cop-
per mine at Panguna" (Conyers 1976, 52).
12 Landowner, former radio announcer, and Ona's first cousin (PNGPC, 27 Jan
1989).
13 In March 1988 Premier Joseph Kabui called in national police to conduct
this special operation in an effort to curb rising criminal gang activity or "rascal-
ism." Though hundreds of arrests were made, most were for traffic, not criminal,
offenses.
14 The month after the new PLA was elected.
15 The fact that an Ampaoi youth in particular was leading a rascal gang com-
plicates the neat generational dichotomy set up in national media reports on the
PLA-RMTLTF leadership struggle, which did not reflect the considerable power
and personal wealth amassed by the old board and their families. This board had
been chaired by Ampaoi Senior since its inception in 1981, though original terms
stipulated annual elections. After the RMTLTF headquarters were occupied by the
new PLA, Ampaoi was pressured by the provincial government to announce new
elections at the next RMTLTF annual general meeting, set for April 1989 (AB, 26
Aug 1988). Apparently this was not soon enough for the new PLA, and much
Ampaoi family property was destroyed in the early arson attacks. The "payback"
underscores both the political aspects of rascal-BRA rivalry and the obstacles Ona
faced in controlling rascal activities, even within his own area.
,. ".1'110 .. I
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16 The Times did carry some coverage of an effort by traditional leaders to
mediate in a dispute over canoe traffic between Bougainville and the Shortland
Islands (TPNG, 29 Nov 9°,4).
17 See Griffin and Kawona 1989.
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